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A COMMON LAW ACTION FOR THE ABUSIVELY
DISCHARGED EMPLOYEE
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the American legal system incorporated into the common law a rule that an employer,
unless otherwise limited by an express term in the employment agree-

ment, could discharge an employee for any reason whatsoever without
legal liability.1 This absolute right of discharge has been undercut during the last fifty years by statute,' by judicial decisions, 3 and by the

evolution of collective bargaining.4 Beyond the restraints imposed by
these developments, however, the basic principle of the employer's absolute right to discharge has remained unimpaired.5
In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,6 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire reevaluated the vitality of the rule under contemporary legal, social, and economic conditions. The court, in a summary fashion
that belies the importance of its decision, concluded that the rule inade1. 1 C. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 159
(2d ed. 1913) [hereinafter cited as LABArr]; Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis-A Judge for Our Season, 24 RuTGERs L. REV. 480
(1970); Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 CoLuM. L. REV. 107
(1942).
2. See text accompanying notes 50-63 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 79-92 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 64-78 infra.
5. See, e.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964); Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir.
1959); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960); Elliott v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 36, 156 S.E.2d 656 (1967); May v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 189 Kan. 419, 370 P.2d 390 (1962); Copeland v. Gordon Jewelry Corp.,
288 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 1974); See also 9 S. WILLIsToN, CONTRACrs § 1017 (Jager ed.
1967); R.sTATEmNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §

762 (1939) (no change presently contemplated by REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
See generally 53 AM. Jum. 2d Master and Servant § 43 (1970); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d
742 (1957).
The principle has, however, been challenged for various reasons by academic commentators. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLTrM. L. R-v. 1404 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Blades]; Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A PreliminaryInquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 279 (1971); Blumrosen,
Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exercise of Employer Disciplinary Power:
United States Report, 18 RuTGERS L. REv. 428 (1964); Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, N.Y.U. 22ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171 (1970);
Note, Implied ContractRights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
6. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
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quately protected the employee's interest in retaining employment. In
so concluding, it held that a discharge "which is motivated by bad faith
or malice or based on retaliation . . . constitutes a breach of the employment contract."'7 The court, by its broad holding, abrogated the
settled common law rule uniformly applied in other jurisdictions and
adopted in its place a rule which will afford employees the opportunity
to seek adjudication of claims for abusive discharge.
This note will examine the factual and legal premises underlying
the employer's right of discharge, both historically and in light of the
realities of the modem employment relationship. It will discuss the
necessity of discarding the principle of an absolute power of discharge.
Finally, it will suggest an alternative basis for the Monge decision which
would achieve the same result reached by the majority, while avoiding
the limiting factors incorporated into the decision by the court's reason-

ing.
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company
In September 1968, the Beebe Rubber Company hired Olga
Monge to work in the company's unionized factory. The employment
agreement was oral, and no mention was made by either party of the
expected duration of employment. Initially, Monge worked without
incident. After three months, she applied for a job opening at a higher
wage and was told by her foreman that she would have to be "nice"
if she wanted the job. 8 She was granted the promotion and her foreman soon asked her to go out with him. She refused, however, explaining that she was married and had three children. Shortly thereafter, Monge was transferred to another position at a lower wage and
her overtime was discontinued. During this same period the personnel
manager, aware that Monge's foreman used his position to force himself on female employees, warned her not to make trouble.
In July 1969, the foreman assigned Monge an extra task she believed could not be done without falling behind in production. When
she complained to the union steward, the foreman ordered her to get
to work and discharged her when she refused to obey; she was reinstated with the assistance of the union. Immediately thereafter she
missed work for over a week due to illness. Upon returning, Monge
was ridiculed by the personnel manager for showing up. Later that
night, she was found unconscious and taken to the hospital. Five days
after her release from the hospital, Monge was discharged by the personnel manager for the stated reason that she had been absent from
work three consecutive days without notification.
7. Id. at 551.
8. Id. at 550.
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Monge sued Beebe Rubber Company for breach of an at-will em-

ployment contract, claiming that her discharge was the result of her
foreman's hostility, which allegedly stemmed from her refusal to go out
with him. The jury found in her favor.9 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire upheld the decision on the issue of liability,
remanding on the issue of damages.' 0
In support of its decision, the court first invoked and relied on developments in landlord and tenant law. In that field, the court noted,

the traditional common law rules had been heavily weighted against the
tenant.

When asked to reappraise those rules in light of the realities

of the contemporary landlord-tenant relationship, New Hampshire had
joined a growing number of states in determining that they could no

longer be justified, and, accordingly, had updated the common law to
reflect modem conditions."
The court recognized that the realities attending the relationship
between employer and employee had also changed over the years, necessitating that the prevailing common law rule insulating the employer
from liability for a wrongful discharge be similarly abrogated. The

court reasoned that "[i]n all employment contracts, whether at-will or
for a definite term, the employer's interest in running his business as
he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in

maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining
a proper balance between the two."'1

2

The holding of the court was

9. The dissent notes, but does not discuss the ramifications of, Monge's failure
to pursue the grievance procedures contained within the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 553. As a general rule, national labor policy requires that an employee must at
least attempt to exhaust grievance and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining agreement before resorting to the courts. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650 (1965). This requirement must, however, be raised as a defense by the employer,
an action apparently not taken in the instant case and thus not dealt with by the court.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967); Letter from Joseph M. Kerrigan, attorney
to defendant, Mar. 5, 1975. For a discussion of whether the court could have imposed
liability irrespective of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, see text accompanying notes 112-46 infra.
10. The case was remanded on the damage issue because the jury had awarded
Monge damages for mental suffering. Because the court characterized the right involved
as contractual in nature, it felt damages for mental suffering were not generally recoverable. The court also noted that the plaintiff had failed to present any medical testimony
to support an allegation of mental suffering. See 316 A.2d at 552. The different measure of damages which may be applied depending on whether the action is characterized
as contract or tort is discussed in note 103 infra.
11. See Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528 (N.H. 1973) (abolishing traditional rule
of landlord tort immunity); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971) (abolishing common law rule that a landlord is under no duty to maintain leased dwellings in habitable
condition); cf. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969) (proof of retaliatory motive on the part of the landlord constitutes a good
defense to eviction proceedings).
j 12. 316 A.2d at 551.
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very explicit: "We hold that a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice
or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment
13
contract.'
Foundations of the Absolute Right of Discharge
The rule that an employment contract for an indefinite period is
at will and may be terminated at any time "for good cause, bad cause
or no cause" and "for any reason or no reason"' 4 evolved during the
nineteenth century. This rule was thoroughly consistent with the
deeply rooted laissez-faire convictions of the time and was regarded as
part of a progressive reaction to the status concepts which had previously dominated the employment relationship. 15 In the century since
the rule was formulated, however, vast changes in the economic, social,
and legal conditions in American society have occurred. In order to
understand fully how contemporary factual and legal realities attending
the employment relationship justify and even compel restricting the traditional right of discharge, it is necessary to examine the bases of the
adoption of the common law rule establishing that right.
The law of employment from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth was founded upon status principles. Although the relationship
was consensual, the rights and duties arising from it depended upon
the positions that master and servant occupied in the relatively stable
feudal society. The legal conception of those positions developed by
analogy from the feudal relation of lord and tenant, and, consequently,
ideas of paternalism and subordination pervaded legal attitudes toward
the master-servant relationship.' 6 The legal consequences flowing
13.

Id.

The court correctly made no attempt to prejudge when a dismissal would

expose an employer to liability under this standard. Because of the nature of the action,
a breach of the imposed obligation cannot be judged in the abstract, but must turn on

all the facts of each case.

Professor Blades has, however, listed some illustrations of

discharges which he feels should be considered abusive and which may be useful under
some circumstances in ascertaining whether a discharge is actionable. Blades, supra

note 5, at 1406-10.
14. See cases cited note 5 supra.
15. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 173-74 (10th ed. F. Pollack 1906). See also
Timberg, The Decline and Renaissance of Economic Liberties, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 147
(1952).
16. See 1 LABArr, supra note 1, § 1, at 6-8, § 3. See generally R. PouND, THE
SPIUT OF THE COMMON LAW 20-31 (1921); 1 G. TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 204
(1953). Many viewed the legal status of master-servant as essentially forming one of
the domestic relationships. One nineteenth century treatise writer stated that "[w]ere
the writer . . . untrammelled by authority, his treatment of this topic [master and servant] as one of the domestic relations, would be confined to what are denominated at
common law menial servants . . . . But . . . legal precision must sometimes be sacri-
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from this conception included the imposition of reciprocal rights and
duties designed to protect the relationship. 17 In so protecting the indefinite employment relationship, common law courts recognized implied-in-law obligations prohibiting an unjust termination by either
party. It was presumed that an indefinite hiring was for a term of one
year.'
Dismissal before the end of this implied term was restricted
by a requirement of just cause.' 9 Although initially accepted in American jurisdictions,2 0 these protective restraints were increasingly disfavored and were ultimately repudiated during the latter part of the
nineteenth century.
The substituted approach stemmed from a rule formulated by a
treatise writer in 1877:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out
a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof.
A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that
it was for a day even,
2 1 but only at the rate fixed or whatever time
the party may serve.
ficed to legal usage; and as terms have been carried in both instances beyond their original signification, for the sake of analogy, we are bound to follow ...." J.SclouLER, A TREATIsE ON THE LAw OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 600

(1870).

17. The original purpose behind this policy appears to have been to protect the
employer. The known source of legal concern with the employment relation is the Ordinance of Labourers, 23 Edward Ill, c. 2 (1349), which was followed by a series of
Statutes of Labourers beginning in 1351. These fourteenth century statutes were enacted
during the extreme labor shortage following the Black Death and sought to protect the
employer from unauthorized quitting before the end of the agreed term without just
cause. 2 W. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLiSH LAw 459-60 (3d ed. 1923). However, there is some documentation that, beginning with the sixteenth century, these restraints upon wrongful termination were imposed to protect the worker and to curb unemployment. See R. MoRIus, GovERNimNT AND LABOR IN EARLy AMERCA 17-18
(1946).
18. 1 LABATT, supra note 1, § 156; see, e.g., Fawcett v. Cash, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026
(K.B. 1834). Blackstone states that this presumption was based upon equitable principles. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *425.
If the parties continued the employment beyond the year, it was further presumed
that the parties intended to be obligated for an additional one-year term. "If a master
hire a servant, without mention of time, that is a general hiring for a year, and if the
parties go on four, five, or six years, a jury would be warranted in presuming a contract
for a year in the first instance, and so on for each succeeding year, as long as it should
please the parties: such a contract being implied from the circumstances, and not expressed, a writing is not necessary to authenticate it." Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng.
Rep. 786, 787 (C.P. 1827).
19. 1 LABATr, supra note 1, § 183; C. SMITH, Law OF MASTER AND SERVANT 37,
112 (7th ed. C. Knowles 1922).
20. See, e.g., Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 127, 26 N.E. 143, 145 (1891);
Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255, 257 (1857); Bascom v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431, 43334 (1882).
21. H. WOOD, A TATTSB ON Tm LAw OF MASTER AND SaVANT § 134, at 272
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By the beginning of the twentieth century, this doctrine had become
the prevailing rule governing the right of discharge.2 2 In the absence
of a written contract for a specific term, the employment was at will,
and the employer's freedom to discharge was absolute; the employment
relation was considered to be strictly contractual.
The courts offered little explanation or analysis of this reversal in
policy from a status-oriented protection of the relationship to a con-

tractual approach with no legal restriction on the power of dismissal.
The factual and legal premises underlying the shift may be inferred,
however, from an examination of how the legal community and that
portion of society whose views influenced the law perceived the economic and social needs of the period. The rule was adopted in the
milieu of an emerging industrial society. The latter part of the nineteenth century was a period of tremendous economic development. It
was also a period in which entrepreneurs ran heavy risks; business failure was common and could be avoided only by great skill and good
fortune.2" So that these risks might be minimized and industry encouraged to expand, courts created a legal framework to protect the em-

ployer.24 This protection of industry was accomplished, in part, by

generally incorporating the law of employment into a developing body
25

of contract law.

(1877) (citations omitted). Although Wood cited four American cases as authority,
none supported his proposition. See Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469, 476 (1921). Despite this
lack of authority, courts adopting the rule soon after generally relied upon Wood's
treatise for support. S'ee, e.g., The Pokanoket, 156 F. 241, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1907);
Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 17 Del. 581, 582-83, 43 A. 609, 610-12 (Super. Ct.
1899); McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 557-59, 11 A. 176, 178-79
(1887); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895).
22. 1 LABATr, supra note 1, § 159; Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469, 470-71 (1921).
23.

E. JOHNSON & H. KRooss, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 242 (1960).

There were

three financial panics and a severe seven year depression during the last third of the
nineteenth century. Moreover, it was a period of generally falling prices. T. COCHRAN
& W. MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 136 (rev. ed. 1961).
24. The policy considerations underlying the development of judicial doctrines of
the period were examined by the Supreme Court: "Perhaps the nature of the present
problem can best be seen against the background of one hundred years of master-servant
tort doctrine. Assumption of risk is a judicially created rule which was developed in
response to the general impulse of common law courts at the beginning of this period
to insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing the 'human overhead' which
is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the doing of industrialized business.
The general purpose behind this development in the common law seems to have been
to give maximum freedom to expanding industry." Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
318 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1943)

(citations omitted).

25. L. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 18-23 (1965). Even tort principles
governing the employment relationship were interwoven with contract law. The assumption of risk doctrine discussed by the Supreme Court (see note 24 supra) was justified
by courts on the ground that the employees were free to allocate the risk in the contract
of employment. See, e.g., Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49,
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It is not surprising that such a legal policy was developed. Americans in the nineteenth century placed an extremely high value on economic growth. As Professor Hurst has noted, they were thoroughly
convinced it was "socially desirable that there be broad opportunity for
the release of creative human energy," particularly in the "realm of the
economy."20 All society, it was believed, would share in the social
benefits that would flow from rapid economic growth. Furthermore,
this nineteenth century preoccupation with the market as a social institution fed upon, and in turn promoted, prevailing laissez-faire beliefs.
Laissez-faire formed the keystone of legal policy during this period. That the employment at will doctrine reflected this philosophy
is illustrated in two Supreme Court decisions in the early twentieth
century. In interpreting the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court elevated the absolute power of discharge to a constitutionally protected right of liberty and property.
Both cases involved the discharge of an employee solely because of
union membership. In both cases, the Court invalidated the legislation
which had proscribed discharges for that reason.
In the first case, Adair v. United StatesR2 the specific charge was
that the defendant, an agent of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Company, had violated a federal statute barring common carriers from
dismissing employees for their union membership. The Court, in striking down the statute, declared that the employer and employee each
had an equal right to terminate the relationship for any reason, and
any legislation disturbing that "equality" was an "arbitrary interference
with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in
a free land."2 8 Although the Court was only characterizing the right
of discharge in the constitutional sense, the philosophy expressed parallels the attitude of common law courts in this area. The intertwining
of common law and constitutional rights is underscored by the Court's
analysis. In justifying its decision, the Court quoted approvingly from
Cooley's treatise on torts:
It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to
refuse business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the
refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice. With his reasons, neither the public nor third persons have any legal concern. It is also his right -to have business
relations with any one with whom he can make contracts, and if
56 (1842). For a general discussion of the employer's common law liability during the
nineteenth century, see H. WooD, A TREATIS ON nH LAW OF MAS&R AND SERVANT
§§ 258-76 (1877).
26. J. Husr, LAw AND
CONDiIONS OF FREEDoM IN THE NmETEENTH-CENTuRy UNrrTD STATES 5-6 (1956).

27. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).

28. Id. at 175,
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he is wrongfully
deprived of this right by others, he is entitled to
29
redress.
A few years later, in Coppage v. Kansas,30 the Court elaborated
on its reasons for concluding that the absolute right of discharge was
constitutionally protected. At issue was the constitutionality of a state
statute outlawing yellow dog contracts." In striking down the statute,
the Court clearly expressed its firm belief in both unrestricted freedom
of contract and rights of private property:
[S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the
right of private property without at the same time recognizing as
legitimate those inequalities of32fortune that are the necessary result
of the exercise of those rights.
These two opinions of the Court implicitly make extreme assumptions about an employee's capabilities and freedom of choice which are
justified only by a philosophy of economic individualism and laissezfaire. These assumptions are also reflected in judicial decisions which
applied the terminable at will doctrine. Although a possible inequality
within the relationship was recognized, it was assumed that the employee could always overcome any economic handicaps. It was taken
for granted that an employee was free either to contract for any needed
protection3 3 or to terminate employment at any time and seek a better
bargain elsewhere.
One may question whether these assumptions
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 173, quoting T. COOLEY, LAw OF TORTS 278 (1880).
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
A yellow dog contract is a contract in which the employer requires the em-

ployee to agree, as a condition of employment, not to become or to remain a member
of any labor union.
32. 236 U.S. at 17. As in Adair, the Court stressed the parties' mutual right to
terminate the employment relationship at any time: "To ask a man to agree, in advance,

to refrain from affiliation with the union while retaining a certain position of employment, is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional freedom. He is free
to decline the employment on those terms, just as the employer may decline to offer
employment on any other .......
Id. at 21.
33. Indeed, the doctrine of freedom of contract, the paramount policy underlying
general contract theory, was premised upon an assumption that parties have approximately equal bargaining power. See generally Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ.
454 (1909).
34. Many decisions applying the terminable at will doctrine have expressly acknowledged this assumption. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court rationalized:
"An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently, thereby cutting

himself off from all chances of improving his condition; indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and the spirit of our institutions that any man
should thus handicap himself; and the law will presume . . . that he did not so intend.
And if the contract of employment be not binding on the employee for the whole term

of such employment, then it cannot be binding upon the employer; there would be lack
of 'mutuality.'" Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So.
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underlying the rule of an absolute right of discharge were realistic at
the time of the rule's incorporation into the common law. Regardless

of their soundness at that time, however, the validity of those assumptions and of the rule must be judged in light of contemporary social
conditions and modem legal values.
The Modern Employer-Employee Relationship
The modem employment relationship negates any assumption that
an employee is free to protect himself contractually from wrongful discharge. Only the most unusual employee possesses sufficient bargaining power to insist upon a restriction of the dismissal power. For most
individuals, the terms of the employment contract are imposed on a

take-it-or-leave-it basis by the corporate employer. Commentators, 85
legislatures, 6 and courts 7 have on numerous occasions substantiated
the existence of this inequality of bargaining power.
It may be argued that unionization in effect equalizes bargaining

power and, hence, that the employee does not need judicially fashioned
legal protection for his job because he is able to achieve that same protection through organization and collective bargaining. This argument
fails, however, for several reasons. In the first place, unionization provides no protection for the individual employed in a business where the

employer has successfully resisted organizing attempts.38

Second,

760, 761 (1932); accord, Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 393, 153
N.W.2d 587, 590 (1967).
35. See, e.g., A. BERLE, ThE 20T CENTURY CAPiTALIST REVOLUTION 32-33
(1954); J. GALurrH, AuucmA CAPrrmAsM 114 (2d ed. 1956); cf. J. GALBaTH, THE
NEW INDusnmAL STATE (2d ed. rev. 1971); Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the
Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALiF. L. Rv. 1247, 1252
(1967).
36. See, e.g., NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); CAL. LABOR CODE § 923 (West
1971).
37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937);
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921);
Kansas v. Coppage, 87 Kansas 752, 759, rev'd, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Jones & Laughlin,
the Court declared: "Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said
. . . that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that
if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless
unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment ..
" NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
38. Union protection under the NLRA is premised upon the concept of majority
rule. If the union fails to prove (generally through an election) that it has majority
support, the employer is under no duty to bargain on other than an individual basis.
Compare NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), with id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1970). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that an agreement between
an employer and a minority union is unlawful. This is true whether the agreement purports to bind all employees in the company or only those who consent to it. See
ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
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unions are concerned with the interests of the collective body, often
at the expense of the individual employee who feels that he has been
wrongfully discharged. Because the union usually maintains exclusive
control over the right to utilize the grievance-arbitration machinery, a
decision to sacrifice the individual's interests in return for a larger benefit for the majority may lawfully strip the employee of job protection. 9
Finally, the argument overlooks the fact that many employees prefer
not to be represented by labor unions. For these individuals, it is no
solution to insist that they join labor unions in order to obtain basic protection against abusive discharge.
The seriousness of the employee's inability to protect himself from
discharge is compounded by the importance of employment. Traditional assumptions about economic individualism are no longer compatible with actual conditions of employment. Professor Tannenbaum
states that
[w]e have become a nation of employees. We are dependent
upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people
have become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their
jobs they lose every resource, except for relief supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of the
people upon others for all of their income is something new in the
world. For 40our generation, the substance of life is in another
man's hands.
Moreover, modern studies show that this dependence is not exclusively economic. Within the employment relationship, the employee seeks fulfillment of many of his needs for social status and identity.4 For many it is the decisive context from which they draw their
social aspirations and beliefs.42 Discharge from employment cuts the
39. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964); J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39 (1944). The duty of fair representation has been developed to afford some protection against this threat. For a discussion of the present inadequacy of this protection, see text accompanying notes 117-26 infra.
40. F. TANNENBAUM,A PMLOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis deleted). The
modem economic conditions of our society were summarized by C. Wright Mills:
"[Tihe centralization of property has shifted the basis of economic security from property ownership to job holding; the power inherent in huge properties has jeopardized the
old balance which gave political freedom .... For the employees, freedom and security, both political and economic, can no longer rest upon individual independence in
the old sense. C. MILLS, WrTE COLLAR 58 (1951). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-73 (1964).
41. Kahn, The Meaning of Work: Interpretationand Proposal for Measurement,
in THE HUMAN MEANING OF SOCIAL CHANGE (A. Campbell & P. Converse eds. 1972);
SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF

HEW, WORK IN AMERICA 4-10 (1973).

42. "Every study of workers shows that they consider the social function of the
enterprise the most important one. They place the fulfillment of their demands for social status and function before and above even the fulfillment of their economic demands. In survey after survey the major demands of industrial workers appear as demands for good and close group relationships with their fellow workers, for good rela-
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off from these pyschic gratifications, causing loss of selfemployee
48
esteem.
Modem employment conditions have not only eroded assumptions
underlying the principle of an absolute power of discharge, but they
have also generated basic expectations in the employment relationship
concerning the exercise of that power. Employees working within a
corporate structure have developed expectations that they will be
treated fairly and equally with other employees.44 These expectations
stem in part from seniority and retirement policies implemented by
employers to encourage corporate loyalty and employment stability,4 5
but they also appear to be a product of the modem corporate environment. In most contemporary businesses, the employer in the old sense
has been replaced by a boss who is himself an employee. Because
management thus participates in the employee role, other employees
feel that management should recognize basic rights to job security.46
Employers, on the other hand, have also accepted the idea of restraints
on their discretion to discharge.
Of course, the conditions -and meaning of employment vary, and
the character of expectations regarding employee rights will similarly
vary. Nevertheless, enough cumulative evidence from different
sources now exists to confirm that contemporary conditions of employment "provide an environment favorable to managerial self-restraint
and mutual expectations regarding employee rights. 48 The existence
of this environment does not diminish the need for judicial protection
against abusive discharge; the employer cannot be relied on to be responsive to these expectations. Rather, it supports the conclusion that
judicial restriction of the right to discharge corresponds with the realidions with their supervisors, for advancement, and above all, for recognition as human
beings, for social and prestige satisfactions, for status and function. Wages, while undoubtedly important, rank well down the list." P. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 47-48

(1950).
43. M. AmEN, L. FERM & H. SHEPPMARD, ECONOiC FAiLURE, ALmENATION, AND
Ex'REmIsM 2 (1968).
44. P. SELzImCK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDusTRLIL JusncE 185-93 (1969).
45. G. BLOOM, & H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 294 (5th ed.
1965); G. PALMER, H. PsNus, R. WiLCOCK, M. HERMAN & C. BRAnmwRD, THm RELUCTANT JOB CHANGER (1965); M. REDER, LABOR IN A GROWING ECONOMY 490 (1957).
46. IL VOLLMER, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSIP 143
(1960). See also E. GlNzBmt & L BERG, DEMOCRA'IC VALUES AND THE RIGHTS OF
MANAGEMENT 47-49 (1963).
47. P. SELZNICK, LAw, SOCIETY, AND INDuSTRIAI JUSTICE 84-89 (1969); Fisher,
When Workers are Discharged-An Overview, 96 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 4, 5 (June
1973).
48. H. VOLLMER, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSmP 3

(1960).
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ties of the modem employment relationship and protects reasonable expectations arising from that relationship.
Legal Developments Restricting The Right to Discharge
Legal values and policies have undergone a dramatic transformation since the late nineteenth century when the principle of an absolute
power of discharge was reocgnized by common law courts. The trend
of the law has been to recognize exceptions, qualifying the right to discharge in a variety of situations. The increasing number of these exceptions evidences society's apprehension of the employer's power to
discharge and challenges the vitality of a doctrine sanctioning the unrestricted exercise of that power. Although many of the restraints have
resulted from collective bargaining, they are today so pervasive that
they suggest a "new climate prevailing generally in the relationship of
employer and employee" which the courts can no longer ignore.4"
Statutory Restraints
During the 1930's, aided by judicial rejection of the constitutional
philosophy embodied in Adair and Coppage,5° legislatures took a decisive turn toward regulating the employment relationship. This change
in policy was emphasized in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 51 the enactment of which has restricted the employer's
power of discharge in two ways. First, the act makes unlawful the discharge of any employee as -a result of his exercising rights protected
under the act. Basically, these are the rights to organize and join 5 a2
labor organization and to bargain collectively with the employer.
More importantly, the NLRA has fostered the growth of collective bargaining, which in turn has led to a new body of labor law barring abusive discharges.53
Since the enactment of the NLRA, there has been extensive statutory regulation of the power of discharge by both the federal government and the states. Unfortunately, this flurry of legislative activity
has for the most part resulted in a patchwork scheme which safeguards
49. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
50. "The course of decisions in this Court since Adair v. United States . . . and
Coppage v. Kansas. . . have completely sapped those cases of their authority." Phelps

Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941). Justice Black later wrote for the
majority: "This Court beginning at least as early as 1934 . . . has steadily rejected
the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases."

Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), formerly ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
52. See NLRA §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1970).
53. See text accompanying notes 67-78 infra.
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only certain classes of employees from wrongful discharge. 54 For example, public employees, 55 veterans, 56 debtors,- 7 and the aged 58 are all
protected by various federal and state statutes circumscribing the em-

ployer's power to discharge.
Other statutes restrict the power of discharge, not because of a
direct concern with the dismissal power, but as a means to effectuate
or implement other policies. Thus, the federal governmen 9 and the
majority of states60 have enacted statutes prohibiting any discharge on

the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Many statutes
similarly proscribe discriminatory discharge because of physical handicap, 61 or political activity or affiliation. 62 In addition, numerous statutes provide that an employer may not discharge an employee for exercising any rights recognized by or opposing any practices forbidden

by those statutes,6 or
for testifying or taking part in 'any proceeding un3
der those statutes.
54. The United States is currently the only major industrial nation in the world
having enacted no statutory provision to protect all employees from wrongful discharge.
INDIusThiAL RELATIONs REsEA cH ASS'N, THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 106 (G. Somers ed. 1973); cf. INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENcES 1919-

66, Recommendation No. 119, § 2(1), at 1060-63 (1967).
55. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.807 (Supp.

1974); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-49.11 to .14, -66.11 to .16 (Supp. 1973).
56. See, e.g., Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b)
(1970); CAL. MiL. & VET. CODE § 394 (West 1955).
57. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970); CAL.
LABOR CODE § 2929 (West Supp. 1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-584 (1973); HAWA1I
RET. STAT. tit. 21, § 378-32 (1974 Supp.).
58. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623
(1970); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420.1(a) (West Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-1102

(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1974).
59. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1970).
60. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1974); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(a)
West Supp. 1975); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4-12.02(A) (Page 1973); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1974).
61. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(a) (West Supp. 1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
149, § 24k (Supp. 1975); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (Supp. 1974); RI. GEN. LAws
ANN. § 28-5-7 (Supp. 1973); WASH. R-v. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (Supp. 1973).
62. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102 (West 1971); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
80-11-8 (1963); Nv. REv. STAT. § 613.040 (1973). One of the most comprehensive
human rights laws restricting the right to discharge, enacted by the District of Columbia,
prohibits any discharge based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital
status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, physical handicap, school matriculation, or political affiliation. See Human Rights Law, D.C. CODE

ANN. § 34-11.1 (8 BNA LAB. REL. REP.451:265 (Sept. 1974)).
63. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3) (1970); Occupational Health & Safety Act of 1970 § 1I(c), 29 U.S.C. §
660(c) (1970); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 502(a), 510, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 1132(a), 1140 (Supp. 1975); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(e) (West Supp.
1975).
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Restraints Due to Collective Bargaining

One of the primary reasons for the growth of unionism and collective bargaining was the employees' desire to modify and regulate the
employer's power of discharge." 4 It has been estimated that as many
as 82 percent of collective bargaining agreements contain some general restriction, such as just cause, on the employer's power to dismiss.6 5
These agreements customarily provide for a grievance procedure, and
at least 94 percent of the collective bargaining agreements in effect in
the United States contain a clause for binding arbitration of grievance
disputes. 66 Thus, the employer's common law absolute power of discharge has been severely restricted by the modem collective bargaining
agreement.
In interpreting bargaining contracts, arbitrators have developed a
"common law of the industry." The governing principles are not based
upon the common law, but rather on the social realities of the relationship: the practices, assumptions, understandings, and aspirations within the industry and the enterprise. 67 The existence of this new framework of principles is perhaps best exemplified by the variance between
the common law and arbitral approaches when an employee is discharged for what the union contends is insufficient cause during the
term of an agreement that does not expressly qualify the employer's
right to discharge. Rejecting the principle of an unrestricted power
to discharge, arbitrators have almost uniformly implied just cause or
other requirements into the bargaining contract. 6 This development
is based in part upon a recognition of the drastic nature of discharge.
"It is repugnant to our basic beliefs about fair conduct that an employee
be summarily discharged without any recourse to test either the possibility of error or the fairness of the discipline relative to the conduct
alleged." 69
In the landmark decision of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 0 the Supreme Court began to lend its support to the development of this private system of jurisprudence. In that case, the Court
64. See W. BAER, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE UNDER THE LABOR AGREEMENT 1
(1972); Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exercise of Employer Disciplinary Power: U.S. Report, 18 RuTGERS L. REv. 428, 434 (1964). See also American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921).
65. BNA, [1969] LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 35-36.
66. BNA, [1970] LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 38.
67. See generally M. TROTrA, ARBITATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DIsPuTEs
(1974); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration,72 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1959).
68. See, e.g., Peerless Laundry Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 331 (1968); Keeney Mfg. Co.,
40 Lab. Arb. 974 (1963); Continental Air Transp. Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 778 (1962); Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 761 (1954).
69. New Hotel Showboat, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 240, 241 (1967).
70. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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interpreted section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 71 as
a mandate to federal courts to develop a body of federal common law
based on the policy reflected in the national labor laws.

Under this

mandate, the Court further held that a grievance-arbitration provision
of a collective bargaining agreement could be specifically enforced.
By so holding, the Court repudiated the common law rule that agreements to arbitrate were freely revocable at any time prior to the
72
award.
Three years later, the Court emphasized its commitment to the
development of an industrial common law in a trilogy of decisions
which sharply restricted judicial intervention in the arbitration process. 73 Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated:
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of
the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code
to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate . . . . The collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new common law74
the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.
So that this industrial common law may function free from the rigidity
of the judicial common law, the Court held that ,apart from matters that
the parties expressly exclude, all grievances fall within the scope of the
arbitration clause. 75 A court must therefore confine its inquiry to a
determination of whether the arbitration clause covers the particular
grievance. If it does, the Court must order the parties to arbitrate the
dispute. 76 The Court further concluded that the ability of courts to
77
review the merits of an arbitration award must be similarly restricted.
71. Section 301 provides in pertinent part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees... may be brought
in any district court of the United States... without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." Labor Management Relations
Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970). States have concurrent jurisdiction under
section 301 although they must apply the federal substantive law developed under Lincoln Mills. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
72. 6 S. WILLrSoN, CoNTRAcrs § 1919 (rev. ed. 1938); REsTAT MENT OF CONT"Acrs § 550 (1932).
73. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960). In Enterprise Wheel, the dispute involved the allegedly wrongful discharge of
an employee. The tenor of the Court's opinion, with its emphasis upon a fair solution
in light of the customs and practices within the industry, runs against the principle of
an absolute power of discharge. The Court did not reach the substantive issue, however,
because the union had sought to have the dispute submitted to arbitration.
74. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578-79 (1960).
75. Id. at 581.
76. Id. at 582-83.
77. Id. at 596.
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If the arbitrator's decision is based upon the contract,78 courts may not
upset that decision by applying common law principles.
Judicial Restraints
Although the legal system has abandoned the nineteenth century
belief that there should be no restriction on the right to discharge, the
unorganized employee has for -the most part remained unprotected.
When confronted with a claim based upon an allegedly abusive discharge not falling within the scope of the restrictions discussed above,7"
courts have mechanically invoked the rule that an employer has the
right to discharge for any reason or no reason. 0 A very few jurisdictions have, however, created narrow exceptions qualifying that right.
In Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396,81 an employee was discharged after disobeying his employer's order to testify falsely before
a state legislative committee. The California Court of Appeal, while
conceding that an indefinite employment relationship is generally terminable for any reason whatsoever, recognized that this rule may be
modified by statute or by public policy. The court held that a discharge based on retaliation for refusal to commit perjury was wrongful,
emphasizing that the fact that perjury was a criminal offense was clear
evidence of a strong public policy against it. In so concluding, the
court granted the employee a nonstatutory cause of action against the

employer. 82
In the later California case of Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock
Inn, Inc.8 3 an employer allegedly discharged his employees because
they had engaged in union organizing activities. The court of appeal
held that the employees had stated a cause of action for damages, reasoning that the California Legislature's declared public policy promoting freedom to unionize8 4 should override the employer's interests and
create an exception to the otherwise absolute power of discharge.
78. Id. at 599.
79. See text accompanying notes 51-78 supra.
80. See cases cited note 5 supra.
81. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
82. Upon remand, the Petermann case was tried without a jury, resulting in a judgment that the discharge was unlawful and an award of $50,000 as damages to the plaintiff. This judgment was subsequently affirmed by a different division of the same appellate court. Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 214 Cal. App. 2d 155, 29 Cal. Rptr.
399 (1963).
83. 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961).
84. See CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 922-23 (West 1971). Although the court did not
expressly assert the basis for its jurisdiction, it is clear that for the court to avoid the
preemptive sweep of the NLRA, these parties were necessarily not subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. See Plumbers' Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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Both Petermann and Glenn contain broad language defining public policy. Nonetheless, later California courts have strictly limited the
rulings in those cases to instances where an explicit declaration of public policy has been made by the legislature. 5 The reluctance of the
California courts to broaden the Petermann-Glenn exceptions is illustrated in Mallard v. Boring"8 The employee had been discharged because she informed the local court that she would be available for jury
service. This interference with the functioning of the legal system was
described by the court of appeal as "reprehensible," "selfish," "shortsighted," and "deplor[able]. 8 7 The court nevertheless refused to rule
for the plaintiff in the absence of prior legislation.
Recently, in Frampton v. CentralIndiana Gas Co.,88 the Supreme
Court of Indiana also recognized a judicial exception to the terminable
at will doctrine. The employee had been discharged because she filed
a workman's compensation claim. In reversing the appellate court's
dismissal of the action, the court acknowledged the employer's generally
absolute right to discharge. But "when an employee is discharged
solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right an exception to the
general rule must be recognized." 9
Modern Justifications for the Rule-Geary v. United States Steel
In a recent split decision, Pennsylvania became the only jurisdiction other than New Hampshire to reappraise the terminable at will
doctrine in light of contemporary conditions. Although the majority
declined to modify the common law rule, its opinion proffers some
modem justifications for rentention of that rule and is therefore worthy
of close inspection.
In Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,90 the plaintiff had been continuously employed for fourteen years selling tubular products to the
oil and gas industry. In July 1967, he was summarily discharged without notice, allegedly in retaliation for having pointed out to his superiors that a new tubular casing manufactured by the company was defective and dangerous. The pipe was designed for use under high pres85. Compare Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970),
and Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 168, 79 Cal. Rptr. 543
(1969), with Becket v. Welton Beoket & Associates, 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal. Rptr.
531 (1974), Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967),
Matin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964), and Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
86. 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
87. Id. at 394, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
88. 297 N.E.2d 245 (Ind. 1973).
89. Id. at 428. Contra,Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
90. 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
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sure. When Geary communicated to his superiors his belief that the
pipe had not been adequately tested and constituted a serious danger,
he was ordered to follow directions and sell the pipe. Although agreeing to do so, Geary went to a vice-president in charge of sales of the
product. As a result of this visit, the corporation reassessed the pipe's
safety and withdrew it from the market. Geary was thereafter summarly discharged.
In upholding the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, the
court acknowledged that "economic conditions have changed radically"
since Pennsylvania adopted the common law rule of an absolute right
to discharge. 9 ' The court recognized the inequality in bargaining
power in the employment relationship and the extreme economic dependence of the employee upon the employer. Nevertheless, the court
dismissed the complaint. Although it admitted that it might "plausibly" create a cause of action where there existed a threat to a "recognized facet of public policy,"9 the court was unwilling, under the facts
presented, to abrogate the common law rule for several reasons.
The court's weakest argument for retaining the traditional rule
was based upon fears that recognition of a cause of action against abusive discharge would burden the judicial system by increasing the workload and creating problems of proof.9" Although increased litigation
is a valid concern, it should not influence a determination whether to
grant a class of litigants access to the courts: "[i]t is the business of
the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a
'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on
'
the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such grounds."94
As to problems of adequacy of proof, courts must daily separate
genuine from baseless claims. "[Tlhe danger that the average jury will
identify with, and therefore believe, the employee"9 5 is not by any
means a novel problem. Courts consistently find ways and means to
safeguard against this danger -through rules of evidence and requirements as to the sufficiency of evidence. There is no reason why they
should not be similarly equal to the task in redressing abusive discharges. In formulating standards of proof, courts may draw from ju91. Id. at 176.
92. Id. at 180. Implicitly, the court endorsed the Petermann and Frampton decisions. In discussing and factually distinguishing those cases because each involved
"clear and compelling" legislative declarations of public policy, the court stressed that
"[iut is not necessary to reject the rationale of these decisions in order to defend the
result we reach here." Id. at 180 n.16.
93. See id. at 179.
94. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].

95. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 179 n.13 (Pa. 1974),
quoting Blades, supra note 5, at 1428.
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dicially developed standards and procedures for proving unlawful discharge under the various statutes that restrict the right to discharge."
The Geary court supported its speculation that sifting out fictitious
claims will be difficult by quoting extensively from an article by Professor Blades which considers the potential for fraud if the courts recognize a cause of action for abusive discharge.9 7 Professor Blades expressed the fear that juries may tend to favor the employee's version
of the facts and, consequently, he believed that problems of proof present a strong argument against permitting discharged employees to
seek adjudication of their claims. He concluded, however, that "[t]he
problem of proof is not insurmountable, for there are a number of evidentiary techniques available to the courts by which the genuineness
of a claim might be reasonably guaranteed . . . ."" Substantiating
this conclusion, he discussed how courts may, for example, create presumptions or increase the employee's burden in order to ensure sufficiency of proof.99 In short, the Geary court's arguments reveal an unwarranted lack of faith in -the ability of the judicial system to deal with
the problem of groundless or fraudulent claims.
The majority in Geary stressed that "[o]f greater concern is the
possible impact of such suits on the legitimate interests of employers
in hiring and retaining the best personnel available. The everpresent
threat of suit might well inhibit the making of critical judgments by employers concerning employee qualifications." 10
This argument has
substantial merit, but it can be refuted on two grounds.
First, the court's contention greatly exaggerates the inhibiting effect of the recognition of a cause of action on the employer's power
of discharge. Recognizing an action for bad faith, malicious, or retaliatory discharge should only minimally interfere with the employer's
right to discharge. It in no way interferes with the normal exercise
of the discharge power which is necessary to manage a business. Actual experience provides significant support for this conclusion. Under
96. For a discussion of some of these statutes, see notes 50-63 & accompanying
text supra. Almost all of these statutes have some case law solving problems of proof
in discharge cases. Abundant precedent dealing with proof of discriminatory discharge
exists under the various civil rights statutes. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes standards of proof for employment discrimination cases under Title VII). See generally Sutter, Current Procedural and Evidentiary
ConsiderationsUnder Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Ready for the Defense,
6 GA. L. REv. 505 (1972); Note, An American Legal Dilemma-Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. Cm. L. Ra,. 107 (1949).
97. See Blades, supra note 5.
98. Id. at 1429.
99. See id. at 1429-31. See also Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse
of Employee PoliticalRights, 22 SrAN. L. Rv. 1015, 1044-47 (1970).
100. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1974).
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collective bargaining contracts, many employers have long been restricted in the exercise of the right to discharge by just cause requirements. 10 1 Over the years, -these employers have been able to operate
businesses efficiently and profitably. There is no reason to assume that
judicial restriction on abusive and retaliatory discharge will greatly impinge upon the employer's ability to make critical decisions when the
broader restrictions imposed by collective bargaining have not done so.
Second, and more fundamentally, while the employer obviously
has a significant interest in freely exercising the right to discharge without fear of legal liability, that interest does not exist in a vacuum. Certainly, the public interest in protecting against wrongs and doing substantial justice should qualify the right to discharge. The economic and
social realities of the employer-employee relationship, discussed
above, 102 demonstrate the employee's need for protection. In light of
the employee's vulnerable status, courts should treat abusive discharges
as injurious wrongs in need of redress. In this way, moreover, courts
may help to deter abusive exercise of the discharge power.
An Alternative Basis
The Monge decision represents a laudable step toward affording
employees protection against abusive discharge. However, while the
remedy fashioned by the court may provide relief for many employees
who have been wrongfully discharged, limitations engendered by the
court's reasoning may deny redress for others similarly wronged. This
shortcoming in Monge stems from the use of contract principles as the
basis for -the new common law action. By characterizing the action as
one in tort, the court could have avoided these limitations. Two distinct advantages flow from the application of tort principles.' 0 3 First,
the court can prohibit contractual waiver of restrictions on the power
of discharge. Moreover, the court can recognize an independent state
cause of action for unionized employees.
101. See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 35-48 supra.
103. This note analyzes substantive differences between contract and tort. Beyond
the scope of this discussion is the potential difference in recovery of damages. The importance to litigants of whether a contract or tort measure of damages is utilized is obvious. Monge illustrates one resulting difference. Characterizing the action as contract,
the court precluded damages for mental distress. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316
A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1974). While this represents the general contract rule, damages
for emotional stress are normally recoverable in a tort action. Compare RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932), with PROSSER, supra note 94, § 12, at 52. An additional

potential difference in recovery arises from contract and tort rules regarding exemplary
damages. Punitive damages are not recoverable in contract actions, but may be imposed
under tort theory. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTACrS § 1077 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
CORBIN].

See generally PROSSER, ,supranote 94, § 2.
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Contractual Waivers
By grounding its decision on contract principles, the Monge court
leaves open the question whether its holding may be negated by contractual disclaimers of obligations or waivers of rights. If the employment agreement expressly permits a discharge for any reason whatsoever, courts would, under contract theory, be helpless to protect -the
employee from abusive discharge. To be sure, contract law has traditionally protected individuals from overreaching contracts or terms by
voiding those contracts which violate public policy. 10 4 Such action,
however, has always been purely negative in nature.'- 5
Even the recently developed doctrine of unconscionability' 0 6 fails
to provide protection in this situation. Under the unconscionability
concept, a court is no longer restricted, as it seems to have 'been traditionally, to a simple choice 'between enforcement and nonenforcement
of the contract if it finds a single term obnoxious to public policy. Instead, it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so limit the ,application of the unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable results.'0 7 While these additional alternatives authorize explicit judicial policing of socially undesirable contractual provisions, they do not provide a basis for creating
affirmative duties.
It may be argued that the concept of unconscionability could be
utilized to invalidate an express clause in the contract which sanctions
the absolute right of discharge and, subsequently, that a court could
imply or impose contractual obligations restricting the right to exercise
the discharge power. This argument fails, however, to take into account the doctrinal limitations of contract theory. Under contract doctrine, although courts may add terms to the contract for reasons of public policy and irrespective of the parties' presumed intentions, 0 8 these
104. See 6A CoRniN, supra note 103, § 1373-78.
105. See id. § 1373-78, 1534-35; Kahn-Freund, A Note on Status and Contract
in British Labour Lav, 30 MODERN L. REv. 635, 641 (1967); cf. 6A CORBIN, supra note
103, § 1515.
106. The term, as used here, encompasses notions of the need to protect individuals
from contracts of adhesion. See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion--some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
107. RESTATEMEtIr (SEcoND) oF CoNTRACrS § 234 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7 rev.
1973). The comments to section 234 fail to cite a single case in which a clear disclaimer of obligation was invalidated by a court. Cf. UNiFoRM CoMMEcrAL CODE §
2-302.
108. See Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127, 130 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 759 (1946); Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir.
1941); 1 CoRBiN, supra note 103, H9 17, 19, at 46-47; 3 id. § 561. "You always can
imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief
as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy
... ." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Ruv. 457, 466 (1897).
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terms may nonetheless be excluded by an express contract clause precisely to the contrary. 10 9 Of course the suggestion that affirmative obligations be imposed under the guise of contract irrespective of the contract terms does recognize the inequality of bargaining power between
employer and employee and, perhaps, may be applauded as far as social result is concerned. But such an action would be unacceptable in
view of the fact that already legitimated principles exist which may be
drawn upon to deal with the problem.
By characterizing the action as one in tort, the court would recognize a cause of action for abusive discharge regardless of the terms
of the contract." 0 While the tort obligation arises from the contractual
employment relationship existing between the parties, the duty exists
independent of the contract. At the same time, the parties may still
agree in advance that the employee will not hold the employer liable
for any discharge. By applying tort theory, however, the court sounds
a warning that this agreement will not be upheld where the employer
is at an obvious advantage in bargaining power and uses that superior
power to neutralize the protection provided by the court."'
109. One author notes that obligations of good faith and reasonableness are imposed in all contracts within the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code and may not
be disclaimed; he suggests that similar obligations be applied by analogy to employment
contracts to proscribe abusive discharge. Comment, Employment At Will and the Law
of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 238 (1973). This proposition not only ignores
the precedented limits of contract doctrine discussed here, but it also blurs the distinctly
separate nature of statutory and contractual obligations. Cf. L. FRiFDMAN, CoTRnAcr
LAw IN AMERICA 17 (1965); Macneil, Whither Contracts?, 21 J. LEGAL ED. 403, 411
(1969).
110. An example illustrative of the practical effect of this characterization is found
in the field of products liability. Liability was for years premised upon contractual theories of warranty. Although warranties were readily implied on the basis of policy and
any disclaimer construed against the seller, expert drafting could effectively preclude the
imposition of any implied warranties, thus insulating the seller from liability. See, e.g.,
Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927); Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124-34 (1960).
This result was swept aside by judicial recognition that the basis for the action was
in tort. As stated by Justice Roger Traynor for the California Supreme Court: "Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express
or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff . . . the refusal to
permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products [makes it] clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
111. Cf. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 26-27, 403 P.2d 145, 156-57, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17, 28-29 (1965) (Peters, J., dissenting); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
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Recognition of an Independent State Cause of
Action for Organized Employees

In J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB,1 2 the Supreme Court analyzed the
purpose and intent of the NLRA and concluded that a collective bargaining agreement supersedes and voids incompatible individual contract rights. 113 A series of subsequent decisions beginning with Lincoln Mills" 4 has directed that courts develop a body of federal substantive law, based on the policy of the national labor statutes, that is

to be applied to the exclusion of state law when the employee's claim
is based upon breach of a collective bargaining agreement."; It is thus
clear that if the basis for suit is contract and there exists a collective

bargaining agreement, state regulation of wrongful discharge inconsist-

ent with federal principles will not be permitted." 6 This same line
of decisions does not, however, expressly bar state efforts to impose
different substantive restrictions when the basis for the suit is grounded
in tort. This raises the question of whether this different characteriza-

tion of an action permits imposition of liability under the same circumstances. Although no court has dealt directly with the issue, it is submitted that the answer should be in the affirmative: if the organized
employee asserts a tort right against abusive discharge that exists independently of the collective bargaining agreement, that right should be
enforceable in state court. After discussing the significance of this contention, the supporting decisions and policies will be reviewed.
112. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
113. See id. at 337-38. "National labor policy has been built on the premise that
by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen
by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of
bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with his
employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests
of all employees." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
114. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
115. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 655-57 (1965); Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). See generally Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court
and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 751
(1965).
State courts have, however, concurrent jurisdiction under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act to apply federal substantive law. See 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1970); Teamsters Local 714 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
116. This doctrine of federal preemption does not preclude state regulation where
the NLRB declines to assert jurisdiction because the business involved is so small that
the effect of a dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial, NLRA § 14(c), 29
U.S.C. § 164(c) (1970), or where the NLRB lacks jurisdiction because the employer
or employees have been specifically excluded from NLRA coverage under sections 2(2)
or 2(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2)-(3) (1970). See Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine
Engineers, 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
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The Need for Independent Protection
When a unionized employee is wrongfully discharged by the employer, the union generally provides effective assistance in attempting
to gain reinstatement through arbitration." 7 Most injustices are corrected in this manner. It is in the exceptional case that the discharged
employee needs the protection of the state cause of action; such a situation might arise, for example, where there is an abusive discharge but
the union is unwilling to arbitrate. The need for independent protection in such a case arises from the present state of law which restricts
the employee's right to sue upon or to arbitrate an alleged violation
of the collective bargaining agreement. If an organized employee is
discharged and the bargaining agreement contains a binding grievancearbitration procedure for the resolution of disputes, the employee is required to exhaust the grievance-arbitration machinery before direct judicial redress may be sought."" Furthermore, the employee's right to
commence suit against the employer in the event that the union refuses
to process his claim or presents it only perfunctorily has been severely
restricted by the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes." 9
The Court in Vaca upheld the union's right to control the manner
and extent to which an individual grievance is presented. It held that
a wrongfully discharged employee could bring an action against the employer only if the employee could prove that the union breached its
duty of fair representation in handling the grievance. 2 0 The Court
further stated that a breach of this duty was not established by showing
that the grievance was in fact meritorious; it must be proved that the
union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith in settling the
employee's claim.' 2' In so concluding, the Court struck a balance be117.
MENT

See generally W.

BAER, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE UNDER THE LABOR AGREE-

(1972).

118.

"As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy

requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use

of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode
of redress." Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). This requirement is founded upon the strong federal policy favoring arbitration as the desired
method for settling contract disputes. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960).
119. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
120. Id. at 193. In those few instances in which the collective bargaining agreement does not contain a binding arbitration clause, the individual employee may directly
bring suit for an alleged violation of rights under the contract. Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
121. 386 U.S. at 193. Justice Black, in a carefully reasoned dissent, observed that
under the majority's opinion, an employee who "has obtained a judicial determination
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tween the individual and group interests in the collective bargaining
relationship which largely subordinates the interests of the individual
122

employee.

The difficulty in proving arbitrary or bad faith conduct on the part
of the union has left many discharged employees remediless within the
industrial common law. 123 This has been particularly true where the
union's conduct has been negligent. Courts have uniformly held that
mere negligence is not sufficent to allow an action under the standards
delineated in Vaca..24 For example, one federal district court distinguished between "incompetence in handling a grievance and actual hostility, malice or bad faith" on the part of union officials in handling a
grievance.' 2 5 Although admitting that the union may not have exercised "professional standards of competency," the court found that the
26
allegations did not satisfy the Vaca standards.
Undoubtedly, many of the discharges left remediless under Vaca
merely lack "just cause" justification under the collective bargaining
agreement. Some, however, would be actionable under the more restricted criteria articulated by the Monge court. In such cases, the
that he was wrongfully discharged, is left remediless, and [the employer], having
breached its contract, is allowed to hide behind, and is shielded by, the union's conduct."
Id. at 205 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
122. Commentators have for the most part contended that the requirement that the
employee have a separate judicial remedy against his union denies an effective remedy,
and, at least in cases involving an individual employee's rights, should be modified. See,
e.g., Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework
and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFoLK U.L. REV. 1096
(1974); Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967
SuP. Cr. REvr w 81; Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CiN. L. R~v. 55 (1972); Note, The Individual Worker's
Right to Sue in His Own Name in a Collective BargainingSituation, 17 S.D.L. REv.
217 (1972); Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes,
77 YArE LJ.559 (1968).
123. "[W'Je have, in effect, a presumption of regularity of union conduct that is
not easily rebuttable. Except in cases of flagrant discrimination ... it is not likely...
that plaintiffs alleging union violation of the duty to represent fairly will meet with
much success .

. . ."

Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Rail-

way Labor and National Labor Relation Acts, 34 J. AiR L. & Comm. 167, 202 (1968).
124. See, e.g., Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644 (10th Cir.
1973); Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972); Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435
F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971); Bazarte v. United Tramp.
Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970); Simberlund v. Long Island R.R., 421 F.2d 1219
(2d Cir. 1970); Berry v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 85 L.R.R.M. 2408 (D.N.M.
1974); Breish v. Local 771, UAW, 84 L.R.R.M. 2596 (E.D. Afich. 1973); Hines v.
Teamsters Local 377, 84 L.R.R.M. 2649 (N.D. Ohio 1973). See also Tobias, A Plea
for the Wrongfully DischargedEmployee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REv.
55, 90 (1972).
125. Hines v. Teamsters Local 377, 84 L.R.R.M. 2649, 2651 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
126. Id.
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common law tort approach suggests a remedy supplemental to that devised by the Supreme Court in Vaca. When the discharge constitutes
a deprivation of a recognized substantive state right, the employer
should not be insulated from liability by the employee's lack of remedy
under the contractual agreement.
Preemption
The basic issue raised by the suggestion that the cause of action
be extended to organized employees is the extent to which federal labor law would preempt the state court from taking such action. Specifically, the question is whether the state judicial remedy must give
way to the federal policy favoring arbitration as a means of achieving
industrial peace. Resolution of this question depends upon whether
the application of state law in such a case would to some extent frus12 7
trate the purpose of the national labor laws.
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,12 8 the Supreme
Court established the general rule of preemption in labor relations. In
reversing a state award of tort damages against a union for peaceful
picketing, the Court determined that, as a general rule, state courts do
not have jurisdiction over suits which are clearly or arguably within the
National Labor Relation Board's jurisdiction over protected and proscribed activities under sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. 12 9 The Court
reasoned that preemption was necessary in such cases because the
board must have complete authority to develop uniform law in order
to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. Garmon did not, however, address the issue created where the award of tort damages, while based
on action which is not even arguably protected or prohibited under the
30
NLRA, may frustrate the national labor policy in favor of arbitration.
Only one court has been confronted with the question of applying
the supremacy clause in a situation outside the focus of Garmon. In
127.

See Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372

U.S. 714, 722 (1963).

The preemptive power of valid federal laws is granted in the

supremacy clause of the United States Constitution: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby .......
CONST.

U.S.

art. VI.

128. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
129. Id. at 244-45. See NLRA §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 29 U.S..C. §§ 157, 158(a)
(1), 158 (a) (3) (1970). This preemption doctrine has no application to suits under section 301. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
130. Under Garmon and its progeny, the proposed state action would be invalidated
only when the discharge is to discourage employees with respect to union membership,
engaging in concerted activities, and obtaining representation for the purposes of collective bargaining. See NLRA §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1),

158(a)(3) (1970).
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ITT Lamp Division of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v.
Minter, 31 an employer argued that state welfare benefits to strikers altered the relative economic strengths of the parties and therefore infringed upon the national labor policy of guaranteeing free collective
bargaining. Recognizing that Garmon was inapplicable, the First Circuit declared that "[i]n such a situation, a balancing process seems
called for under the general approach to preemption followed by the
Supreme Court, in which both the degree of conflict and the relative
importance of the federal and state interests are assessed."1 2 Employing the balancing test, and following the Supreme Court's conviction
that state action should not be preempted under the supremacy clause
"in the absence of persuasive reasons," '33 the court upheld the challenged application of the state welfare laws.
This same approach may be used in resolving the issue raised
here. As discussed above, 34 the Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of arbitration in the resolution of labor disputes. In United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf, Nav. Co.,'3 5 the Court articulated the basis for this policy. It noted that the function of labor
arbitration is to establish a substitute for industrial strife.' 3 6 Arbitration
provides "the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system
of private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for
their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant
needs and desires of the parties.' 37 In short, the arbitration process
is a flexible, peaceful method by which the parties may settle labor disputes without resort to strikes, lockouts, and similar devices. For this
reason, inclusion in the collective bargaining agreement of a clause
providing for binding arbitration is "[a] major factor in achieving industrial peace . ... "I3 In attempting to promote the effectiveness
of arbitration and to encourage arbitration clauses in collective bargaining contracts, the Supreme Court has consistently supported the exclusivity of the arbitral remedy.'
Clearly, then, national policy favors
arbitration as a method of resolving employment disputes.
131. 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
132. Id. at 992. The First Circuit again applied this balancing test in a suit challenging state payment of unemployment compensation to strikers. Grinnell Corp. v.
Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973).
133. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
134. See text accompanying notes 70-78 supra.
135. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
136. Id. at 578.
137. Id. at 581.
138. Id. at 578.
139. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); cf. Gateway Coal Co.
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On the other hand, there is the state interest. By recognizing a
cause of action in tort, the state manifests its strong policy of protecting
employees from what it regards as wrongful discharge. The traditional
interests of states in redressing private wrongs by granting compensation is beyond question. That this interest includes regulation of the
right to discharge was recognized by the Supreme Court in the case
of Colorado Anti-DiscriminationCommission v. ContinentalAir Lines,
Inc. 4 ' There, the Court considered whether, and to what extent, a
state statute prohibiting hiring and firing based on racial discrimination
was preempted by various federal statutes, including the Railway Labor
Act. Concluding that the purpose of the federal laws were not frustrated by the state statute, the Court held that this exercise of the state's
traditional powers was not barred under the supremacy clause.
Thus, there remains to be resolved the question of potential conflict between the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes
and the state policy of protecting its citizens from abusive discharge.
In this regard, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo. 1 41 is instructive. In that case, the Court accommodated the policy of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act against
discriminatory employment practices' 4 2 and the conflicting national labor policy promoting arbitration. The conflict between the policies
arose when a discharged minority employee sued in federal court under
Title VII after his discharge had been upheld by arbitral decision under
both the just cause and nondiscrimination clauses of the collectible bargaining agreement. The Court rejected the appellate court's determination that the employee was bound by the prior arbitral decision
and had no right to sue under the Title VII. Despite continued emphasis upon the use and finality of arbitration to resolve questions of
contractual rights, the Court reasoned that the employee instituting an
action under Title VII is not seeking review of the arbitrator's decision,
but rather is asserting a separate and independent statutory right. In
reaching its conclusion that the employee was entitled to de novo consideration of the claim, the Court responded to the belief of the district
court and the court of appeals that to permit access to the courts would
substantially undermine the employer's incentive to arbitrate and thus
v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). This approach has not, however, been rigidly
followed where there have been positive countervailing reasons for permitting enforcement of independent substantive rights. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974); U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351 (1971); cf. Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
140. 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
141. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
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would "sound the death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts. 1 4 3
[W]e disagree. The primary incentive for an employer to enter
into an arbitration agreement is the union's reciprocal promise not
to strike . . .. It is not unreasonable to assume that most employers will regard the benefits derived from a no-strike pledge as
outweighing whatever costs may result from according employees
an arbitral remedy against discrimination in addition to their judicial remedy under Title VII. Indeed, the severe consequences of
a strike may make an arbitration clause almost4 essential
from both
4
the employees' and the employer's perspective.'
The Court stated further that arbitration still offers the parties a comparatively fast and inexpensive means for resolving a wide range of disputes, including grievances involving Title VII discrimination. 145 For
this reason, both employer and employee have strong incentive to seek
satisfactory settlement through arbitration, perhaps thereby foreclosing
the need to resort to the judicial forum.
In contrast with Alexander, which dealt with conflicting federal
policies, the issue confronted here concerns the extent of conflict between federal and state policies. Nonetheless, the reasoning of the
Court is persuasive in determining whether a state would be barred
from protecting organized employees from abusive discharge. The arguments advanced in Alexander would be equally applicable in this
kind of case and suggest that a state cause of action for wrongful discharge would not frustrate or undermine the national policy promoting
arbitration of labor disputes if unionized employees were permitted to
pursue that remedy. Hence, weighing the strong state interest in protecting its citizens from what it regards as private wrongs against the
potential minimal interference with national labor policy, it seems that
such state action should not be preempted under the supremacy clause.
As the Supreme Court has stated, the exercise of the state's powers
should not be invalidated unless it "plainly and palpably infringes"
upon federal policy.' 46
Conclusion
The court in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. discarded the common
law rule that an employer may discharge an at-will employee for any
or no reason. In so doing, the court held that hereafter an employee
will have the opportunity to prove in court a claim for bad faith, mali143. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54 (1974), quoting 346 F.
Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971).
144. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1974).
145. Id. at 55.
146. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).
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cious, or retaliatory discharge. The decision of the court in Monge is
important because it is the first to abrogate the principle that the employer's power to discharge is absolute. Unfortunately, the court articulated its reasoning in a disappointingly facile manner, enhancing the
possibility that other courts will be reluctant to follow its lead. This
note has attempted to demonstrate that the common law rule is incompatible with contemporary conditions and values and, thus, that the
holding in Monge is socially desirable. It has also suggested that the
recognized cause of action be grounded in tort. Such characterization
will permit courts to prohibit contractual waiver of restrictions on the
power of discharge, and may enable courts to protect unionized employees from wrongful discharge.
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